This study investigated the relationship between political connections and tax avoidance behaviour in Indonesian listed-firms in 2007-2013 year period. Some firms created links to government for obtaining benefits in various variables such import licensing, taxes, and supplyfunds. We have manually managed to identify politically connected-firms from the annual reports and measure tax avoidance by using Cash Effective Tax Rate (CETR) as the proxy. Our observation indicated that politically connected-firms paid lower corporate income tax than nonpolitically connected-firms. Our study also examined how the status of State Owned Enterprise (SOE) correlates to tax avoidance. Firms hiring politically connected independent commissioners (INDCOM) in this study were more likely to show tax avoidance behavior. However, we have no strong evidence to prove our proposition regarding the type of political connections.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate income tax is one of the primary concerns of both firms and the government. Firms are always trying to manage tax efficiently to reduce their expenses. On the other side, the government is responsible to optimize state revenues from tax. A study showed that one-fourth of US listed firms are able to maintain long-run cash effective tax rates below 20 percent (Dyreng et.al, 2008) . Some other empirical researches have showed how firms were able to efficiently manage their tax (Siegfried, 1974; Porcano, 1986 How political connections and tax avoidance are related is the focus of this study; the outcome of this study will be a significant contribution to tax literature. Faccio (2010) believes that politically connected-firms have higher leverage, pay lower taxes, and have stronger market power than nonpolitically connected-firms. The study of Wu et.al (2012) showed how hiring politically connected manager is a convenient and effective channel for private firms to create links to the government.
When they hire such manager, it will be beneficial to the firms in terms of lower taxes and private taxes information.
We here focus on Indonesia, a country where the institutional environment is weak (Leuz & Gee, 2006; Sudibyo et.al, 2013) . Corruption is a serious issue in Indonesia (as well as other Asian Countries, according to the survey held by Transparency International, 2013). Despite its corruption issue, Indonesia's economic growth is considerably high. World Bank (2011) has named Indonesia as 10 of 12 countries with the largest economic growth as indicated by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This shows that tax is one of the potentials to improve state revenue; thus, it must be significantly optimized. This year, Indonesian Tax Authority has established their tax ratio, aiming the increase from 12% to 14% (Directorate General of Taxes, 2015).
We here provided empirical evidence on tax avoidance behavior from firms listed at Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2007-2013 periods. The purpose of our study is to examine the effect of politically connected-firms toward tax avoidance behavior. The recent coordinating Minister on Economy of Indonesia argued that the position of board of directors or commissioners at state-owned enterprise (SOE) for politicians or former of politicians is a tradition in Indonesia (Kompas, 2015) . This is supported by some literatures on political connections in Indonesia (Fisman, Stigler (1971) argued that public resources and powers could be used to improve the economic status of economic groups (such as industries and occupations), which he referred as the demand for regulation. Supply of regulation was characterized by political processes which allow relatively small groups to obtain such regulation. Theory of economic regulation here, is central to determine who will receive the benefits or burdens of regulation, what regulation is in effect, and the effects of the regulation upon the allocation of the resources. Here, bureaucrats tend to use their position by providing rights to businessman for product licensing (Krueger, 1974) Some literatures on political connections in Indonesia has shown the significant role of the connection to the economy (Fisman, 2001) , the relationship to global financing (Leuz & Gee, 2006) , the effect on import licenses decisions (Mobarak & Purbasari, 2006) , the indirect costs of financial distress (Wijantini, 2007) and the ability to collect formal deposit insurance (Nys et.al, 2015 ).
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Political Connections
Tax Avoidance
Tax literatures define tax avoidance in many different way; we here take the definitions broadly that it is the reduction of explicit taxes (Dyreng et However, studies with empirical evidence on relationship between political connections and tax avoidance are still scarce (Adhikari, 2006; Faccio, 2010; Wu et.al, 2012) . Therefore, our study aims to examine the effect of political connections toward tax avoidance. We believe political connections will be beneficial to the firms in terms of gaining more information about tax regulation and favorable tax treatment. We will prove this hypothesis in our paper.
Firms which have political connections are divided into private firms and state-owned enterprise (SOE). That state-owned enterprise have more stable connections with tax authorities positively correlates to tax managing skills; much better than private firms. Therefore we present the following hypothesis:
H 1: Politically connected pay lower taxes than non politically connected-firms.
H 2: SOE able to manage taxes better than private politically connected-firms.
RESEARCH METHOD
Data
To minimize bias caused by different tax regulations on each sectors, our study here focuses on manufacturing firms listed at Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2013 periods. We retrieved our data from OSIRIS Database for pre-tax income, and then we manually collected cash tax paid data from financial statement, and categorized the politically connected firms from their annual reports.
We eliminated several firms which do not comply to the following criteria: no business activities/ missing data, net operating loss (NOL) carry-forward, negative cash tax paid and cash ETR more than one. Finally, our sample consists of 52 manufactured firms, with 364 firm-year observation (Table 1) . 
Measure of Political Connections (POL)
A company is defined as politically connected firm when at least one of its shareholders (anyone controlling at least 10% of voting shares), and one of its top officers (board of commissioners/ directors) is a political party member, a parliament member, a government official (including military officer), a former of parliament member and/or a former of government official (military officer). We also define state-owned enterprises as politically connected firms.
The procedure of the categorization is as follow:
first, we collected the name of commissioners, directors and owners from firms' financial statements. Second, we determine their political backgrounds by investigating individuals' biographies from firms' annual reports. Finally, we collected additional data from various websites to check the information established at the second step. POL is a dummy variable that equals one when a firm has political connections, and zero when otherwise. In this study, we classified 26 firms as politically connected-firms, and 25 firms with no political connections (NONPOL). NONPOL is also a dummy variable which equals one when it is non politically-connected firm, and zero when it is otherwise.
For politically connected-firms, we follow Nys et.al (2015) , where the categorization falls into three different categories based on what is politically connected. The classification is as follow: firms, which at least one of their directors or at least one of their controlling shareholders is politically connected (DIR); firms, which at least one of their commissioners is politically connected (COM); and firms, which at least one of their independent commissioners is politically connected (INDCOM).
To investigate impact of SOE to tax avoidance behavior, we also examine the model bellow:
Measure of Tax Avoidance
Tax avoidance is measured by using Cash Effective Tax Rate (Cash ETR). We calculated a firm's total cash taxes paid over a five-year period and divided that by the sum of its total pretax income over the same five-year period (Dyreng et.al, 2008) . Cash tax paid by the firms can be obtained in the financial statements at the statement of cash flows. The benefit of using cash tax is to avoid tax accrual effects present in the current tax expense. We divided our observation periods into 3 groups 
RESULTS
We here examined the influence of political connections to tax avoidance behavior. The mean of cash effective tax rate (CETR) between politically connected-firms (POL) and non politically connected firms (NONPOL) were compared. Table 2 describes mean comparison of cash effective tax rate. During overall period, non politically connected-firms (NONPOL) has higher mean than politically connected-firms (POL), at 0.3493 and 0.2872, respectively. It indicates that politically connectedfirms pay lower taxes than non-politically connected-firms.
The comparison of cash effective tax rate (CETR) on separate periods yields consistent results. (Table 2) . That there is no influence of difference of corporate income tax tariff is evidential in our study.
From table 2, we investigate the average of cash effective tax rate (CETR) which are paid by politically connected-firms is 28,72%. On the other side, non politically connected-firms pay higher at 34,93%. The average of CETR3 is higher than CETR 7 as the tariff was different at of the two periods. To examine the impact of state owned enterprise to tax avoidance behaviour, we conducted ordinary least square (OLS) regression for testing our model (Table 3 ). The results show that the status of state owned enterprise (SOE) affect their cash tax paid in overall periods at 10% level of significance. It denotes that state-owned enterprises have the ability to manage their tax better than private firms. 
Tabel 2. T-test results
POL
CONCLUSION
Our study has provided empirical evidence on tax avoidance behaviour in Indonesia. Under the framework of previous studies concerning political connections in Indonesia (Fisman, Our findings are consistent to tax avoidance definition by Dyreng et.al (2008) and conceptual terms proposed by Hanlon & Heitzman (2010) , as the reduction of explicit taxes. Consequently, firms which are indicated to avoid taxes in this study might be defined by different means. The avoidance might be driven by their tax managing skills, tax planning, tax aggressiveness, tax evasion and tax sheltering.
Our study has described that tax avoidance behavior by politically connected-firms during 2007-2013 periods in Indonesia. Previous literatures described that political connection gives more benefits regarding import licensing (Mobarak & Purbasari, 2006) , supply of funds and inviting deposits (Nys et.al, 2015) . In this study, we have provided another evidence on the correlation between political connections and tax avoidance behavior.
Politically connected-firms tend to pay lower taxes as compared to non politically connected-firms during observation periods. This supports prior works on political connections and tax literatures (Adhikari, 2006; Faccio, 2010) . In this study, political connections play an important role on cash tax paid by firms. It suggests that the economy of developing countries tend to be relationship-based rather than market-based (Adhikari, 2006) .
For Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes, this study is a valuable contribution to tax collecting activities by describing how politically connectedfirms enjoy tax benefit in Indonesia as compared to others. Proper policies designed by these findings might optimize state revenues from corporate income tax in upcoming years, and in turn, help the directorate in achieving its target.
Control variables and other determinants of tax avoidance are details to improve in further study. Firm size and firm performance are some of the variables to consider, as well as other tax avoidance determinants such as family-ownership shareholder, foreign-operation, high-leverage and dual-listings firms.
1. Tariff of corporate income tax at Indonesia was 28% until 2009, and then it changed to 25% in 2010.
